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Abstract
Traditionally, preferences have been considered stable although there are grow-
ing evidences that such stability is a mere theoretical assumption. Attending to this
fact, it should be interesting to measure how much stability preferences provide in
order to improve decision making processes. Surprisingly, no research has been
found on measuring preferences stability.
To overcome this drawback, this paper proposes a novel approach for measur-
ing the stability of preferences and also for improving understanding of current
and future decisions. In order to be faithful to reality, this research considers de-
cisions like complete pre-orders on a set of alternatives. Following this reasoning,
this paper provides the general concept of decision stability measure as well as
two specific measures: the local and the global decision stability measure. More-
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over, the main features of the novel approach are examined, including several
mathematical results on the behaviour of the proposed measure. And eventually,
this contribution develops two real cases of study, with in-depth analysis of pref-
erences behaviour and their stability over time. Specifically, the first one explores
into the characteristics of Spanish citizens’ voting behaviour and the second one
attempts to analyse European citizens’ preferences about passenger car market.
Keywords: Preference stability, decision stability, complete pre-orders, loss
memory effect.
1. Introduction
Every day people deal with decisions like paying by credit card or by cash,
going on holidays or increasing their pension fund, working or studying, and so
on. These routine decisions and their stability over time have become a central
issue in the actual global world due to the fact that the assumption of stability of
preferences is a key aspect to make accurate market studies and predictions. To
extract conclusions from previous decisions to come decisions, it is necessary to
suppose that individuals make such decisions on basis to the same rules over time.
Imagine, for example, that the manager team of a restaurant wants to change
the daily menu and they ask for customers’ preferences on the actual daily menu
during one year. To ensure a right change in the daily menu, team manager needs
not only to know what the customers’ preferences are but need to know if these
preferences will be stable over time. At first sight one may think that if the cus-
tomers’ preferences are not the same every time i.e., select the same dishes, their
preferences are not stable, but are not necessarily so.
Suppose three customers that rank the starters of the daily menu (seafood
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chowder, roast vegetarian, caesar salad and stag’s grilled) in the following way
for three periods of time:
Customer 1 Customer 2 Customer 3
Period 1
roast vegetarian stag’s grilled caesar salad
seafood chowder caesar salad seafood chowder
caesar salad, stag’s grilled seafood chowder stag’s grilled
roast vegetarian roast vegetarian
Period 2
roast vegetarian caesar salad roast vegetarian
seafood chowder seafood chowder caesar salad
caesar salad, stag’s grilled roast vegetarian seafood chowder
stag’s grilled stag’s grilled
Period 3
seafood chowder caesar salad stag’s grilled
roast vegetarian seafood chowder roast vegetarian
caesar salad, stag’s grilled roast vegetarian caesar salad
stag’s grilled seafood chowder
Table 1: Customers’ preferences for three periods of time.
To take a decision, the manager team needs to establish which of the cus-
tomers’ preferences are more stable although this fact is not obvious. As can be
seen from Table 1, Customer 1 keeps her/his preferences in the periods 1 and
2, but changes them in the period 3. Customer 2 keeps her/his preferences sta-
ble in the period 2 and 3, but changes in the period 1. And finally, Customer 3
changes her/his preferences in every period of time. How much stability do these
customers’ preferences contain? Is it possible to measure this stability? Does
customers’ preferences stability depend on the period of time in which there are
preferences changes? The challenge of this paper is to answer these opened ques-
tions by means of defining a mathematical instrument able to measure the stability
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of the customers’ preferences and consequently, to make manager team’s decision
easier. Therefore, the central thesis of this paper is proposed a novel methodol-
ogy for measuring preference stability over time and also for improving under-
standing of preferences behaviour when preferences are considered like complete
pre-orders (to represent faithfully individuals’ preferences).
This study therefore sets out a general definition of decision stability mea-
sure that includes two minimum conditions, full decision stability1 and decision
stability neutrality2 in order to develop a deep and strong general mathematical
measure. In addition, this study contributes to this growing area of research by
providing two particular decision stability measures: the local decision stability
measure and the global decision stability measure. The study of such measures is
completed including the main features of the novel approaches as well as several
mathematical results on the proposed measures behaviour. Finally, it is hoped that
this research will contribute to a deeper understanding of the proposed measures
including two real cases of study. Specifically, the first one explores into the char-
acteristics of Spanish citizens’ voting behaviour and the second one attempts to
analyse European citizens’ preferences about passenger car market.
This work is composed of seven sections. The first section of this paper, Sec-
tion 2, examines different related approaches in literature. Section 3 gives a brief
overview of the notation as well as some basic definitions. Section 4 is concerned
with the novel general measure proposed in this study as well as two specific
ones: the local decision stability measure and the global decision stability mea-
sure. Section 5 analyses the main features of the novel approaches as well as
1The measure of stability must be maximum if preferences over time are equal.
2The measure of stability must not change if the alternatives are permuted.
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several mathematical results on the proposed measures behaviour3. Section 6 de-
velops two real cases of study, with in-depth analysis of preferences behaviour
and of measuring their stability. Finally, Section 7 presents the findings and the
conclusions of the research.
2. Related research
The stability of preferences has long been a question of great interest in a
wide range of fields like Economic Analysis, Psychology and Decision Making
Analysis and its interest has grown extensively over the last 25 years.
Traditionally and under the perspective of Economic Analysis (Neoclassical
Economic Theory), changes in consumers’ choices over time cause changes in
relative prices but not on consumers’ preferences that remain stable over time. In
the seminal contribution of Stigler and Becker (1977) [1], consumers’ preferen-
ces should be considered stable and if there are differences among the observed
choices over time, these do not lead to an inconsistency. They defended that
preferences must be defined over different state spaces and consequently, the
choices are associated to such spaces.
More recently, experimental literature has emerged that offers conflicting fin-
dings about this conventional assumption (an extensive review of such literature
can be found on [2]). In particular, there are evidences of stability in risk prefe-
rences ([3], [4], [5] and [6]), social preferences ([7], [8], [9] and [10]) and time
preferences ([11], [12] and [10])).
3To keep the paper to a manageable size and to maintain an overall view of the results, all
proofs have been omitted but they are available under request.
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From Psychology perspective, it is assumed that some human behaviours play
an enduring part of human thoughts and feelings. In this type of literature, deci-
sion makers’ choices and behaviours are based on measuring the aforementioned
personality characteristics. In the same way that Economics Analysis research,
these studies on the temporal stability of personality traits do not reach any deci-
sive conclusion (see [13], [14], [15] and [16], among others).
The growing studies under Decision Making perspective examine preferences
stability by means of analysing the consistency of the decision makers choices
([17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22] and [23]). To conclude, Table 2 summarises and
classifies the approaches that have been reviewed.
Based on the aforementioned literature, it could be appealing and necessary to
study and to measure how much stability preferences provide. To our knowledge,
few previous studies have investigated the measurement of preferences stability
(see [24], [25] and [26]). A seminal study in this issue is the work of Gonza´lez-
Arteaga, de Andre´s Calle and Peral [24]. In this contribution authors proposed a
new measure of preference stability under the assumption of dichotomous opin-
ions i.e., individuals approve or disapprove alternatives at different moments of
time. Specifically, authors considered the notion of preference stability similar to
the notion of preferences cohesiveness. This methodology was applied to measure
the stability of patients’ preferences for life-sustaining treatments.
In subsequent papers ([25] and [26]), authors introduced a similar measure-
ment to the one in [24] but in these cases under the assumptions of fuzzy pref-
erences and preferences defined in the unit interval, respectively. By means of
assuming fuzzy preferences authors improved the previous work due to evidence
suggests that humans may experience difficulties in expressing uncertain know-
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Preferences Stability under Economics perspective
Author(s) Hypothesis
Stigler and Becker [1] Stability of preferences
Andersen et. al. [3]
Stability of risk preferences
Harrison, Lau and Yoo [4]
Lo¨nnqvis et. al.[5]
Zeisberger, Vrecko and Langer [6]
Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman and Nam [7]
Stability of social preferences
de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson [8]
Levitt and List [9]
Volk, Tho¨ni and Ruigrok [10]
Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman and Nam [11]
Stability of temporal preferencesTanaka, Camerer and Nguyen [12]
Volk, Tho¨ni and Ruigrok [10]
Preferences Stability under Psychology perspective
Author(s) Hypotheses
Cobb-Clark and Schurer [13]
Stability of personality traits
Cobb-Clark and Schurer [14]
Borghans et. al. [15]
Non-stability of personality traits
Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev [16]
Preferences Stability under Decision Making perspective
Author(s) Hypothesis
Arnott and Gao [17]
Stability of decision makers’ choices
Brandts and Charness [18]
Crosetto and Filippin [19]
Dave et. al. [20]
Ding et. al [21]
Geiger and Schader [22]
Lim and Lee [23]
Table 2: Summary table of studies related to preferences stability
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ledge in a dichotomous way [27].
3. Notation and starting hypothesis
Let N = {1, . . . , n} a society of individuals and X = {x1, . . . , xk} a finite
set of alternatives, | X |≥ 2. There is no loss of generality in assuming that
the individuals and/or the society ranks the alternatives by means of complete
preorders4 on X. This assumption allows to reflect the reality of decision life-
situations. The set of all complete preorders on X will be denoted by W(X).
Let T = {t0, . . . , tT} be an ordered time sequence, namely, a temporal set5.
Let Ri ∈ W(X) be a temporal decision6 on the set of alternatives X at the mo-
ment of time ti ∈ T. The notation xkRixj means that the alternative xk is at last
as good as xj at the moment of time ti.
Let P = (R0,R1, . . . ,RT ) ∈ W(X) × . . . ×W(X) = W(X)T+1 be a
temporal decision profile on the set of alternativesX over T +1 moments of time.
The Ri ∈ P profile element is a temporal decision on X at the moment of time
ti, i ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Let P(X) denote the set of all temporal decision profiles, that
is, P(X) =
⋃
T≥1
W(X)T+1 .
Let P−1 denote the reversal of the temporal decision profile P defined by
P−1 = (R−10 , . . . ,R−1T ) where xkR−1i xj ⇐⇒ xjRixk. The temporal decision
profile P is constant over time toRi if P = (Ri, . . . ,Ri).
Any permutation pi of the alternatives {x1, . . . , xk} determines a permutation
4Reflexive and transitive binary relation, denoted by <.
5It is worth pointing out that moments of time in the temporal set T = {t0, . . . , tT } do not
need to be equidistantly distributed.
6Note that temporal decisions can be taken by individuals or by society.
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of every temporal decision Ri ∈ W(X) via xs piRi xt ⇐⇒ xpi(s)Ri xpi(t) for all
s, t ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Consequently, to each P and pi, there is
associated a temporal decision profile piP = (piR0, . . . ,piRT ).
Likewise, any permutation σ of the moments of time {t0, . . . , tT} determines
a permutation of P by Pσ = (Rσ(0), . . . ,Rσ(T )).
For each temporal decision profile P ∈ P(X), its restriction to subprofile on
the time in I ⊆ T (here I is a subset of T that contains consecutive elements of
T), denoted PI , namely temporal decision subprofile, arises from exactly select-
ing the temporal decisions of P that are associated with the respective moments of
time in I (in the same order). To shorten notation, P i is written instead ofPI when
I = {i}. A overlapped partition is a finite collection of partitions {I1, . . . , Is} of
T = {t0, . . . , tT} satisfying:
• I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Is = T
• For all i 6= j, | Ii ∩ Ij |=
 1 if | i− j |= 1;0 otherwise.
The time sequence that integrates the k-th element of the overlapped partition
is labelled by Ik = {tIk0 , . . . , tIkTk}, and therefore |Ik| = Tk+1. Taking into account
this notation, the previous conditions imply:
• T1 + T2 + . . .+ Ts = T
• tIkTk = t
Ik+1
0 , for k = 1, . . . , s− 1.
Each overlapped partition generates a decomposition of P into consecutive tem-
poral decision subprofiles PI1 ,PI2 , . . . ,PIs such that PI1∪I2∪...∪Is = P .
Let T = {t0, . . . , tT} be a temporal set of T + 1 consecutive moments of time
and suppose that q new consecutive times are added to T, in the following way
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T¯q = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1, . . . , tT+q}. The set T¯q is called extended temporal set.
An temporal extension of a temporal decision profile P ∈ P(X) is a new profile,
P¯q such that includes q new temporal decisions associated to the moments of time
added to T
P¯q = (R0, . . . ,RT ,RT+1, . . . ,RT+q) ∈
⋃
T≥1
W(X)T+1+q
On occasion and for simplicity of notation, P¯ is written instead of P¯1.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xk} a finite set of k alternatives and suppose that q new
alternatives are added to X, such that X˜ = {x1, . . . , xk, xk+1, . . . , xk+q} denotes
the expanded set of alternatives. The set of all complete preorders on X˜ is denoted
by W(X˜). Let R˜i ∈ W(X˜), it is called a expanded temporal decision of Ri ∈
W(X), if both temporal decisions grade the alternatives of set X in the same
way, i.e xrRixs ⇔ xrR˜ixs, ∀xr, xs ∈ X. An expanded temporal profile P˜ =
(R˜0, R˜1, . . . , R˜T ) of P = (R0,R1, . . . ,RT ) is a new temporal decision profile ,
such that each R˜i is an expanded temporal decision ofRi.
Note that besides time, there exits different elements that can cause changes in
preferences (for example, different choice order of alternatives, different scale of
participants (social preferences), and so on). For short, in this paper the stability
of preferences is only considered over time, but the study could be easily extended
to other contexts.
Additionally, the reader should bear in mind that for simplicity this contri-
bution does not distinguish between individual and social preferences and also it
does not consider bounded rationality. These questions restrict the study due to
the fact that over time the interaction between different individuals will lead to
great differences between individual preferences and social preferences, specially
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when the bounded rationality of consumer behaviour is considered (see [28] and
[29]). Thereby, the measuring models may be different for individual preferences
stability and social preferences stability7.
In order to get the purpose of this research and to measure the stability of
decisions over time, it is necessary to choose a strong codification procedure that
allows to compare complete preorders at different moments of time without loss
of preference consistency. Due to this fact, the procedure provided by Gonza´lez-
Artega, Alcantud and de Andre´s Calle in [30], the canonical codification, is used
in this work.
Given a a temporal decision Ri ∈W(X), i ∈ {0, . . . , T}, its corresponding
canonical codification is a real vector namely, the canonical codified temporal
decision, defined by cRi = (c
Ri
1 , . . . , c
Ri
k ) ∈ ({1, . . . , k})k, being cRij the number
of alternatives classifying at most as good as the alternative xj at the moment of
time ti, i.e., cRij =| {q : xjRi xq} |. The set of all possible canonical codified
temporal decisions associated to W(X) is denoted by F = F(W(X)).
Given a temporal decision profile P ∈ P(X), its corresponding canonical
codified temporal decision profile is a (T + 1)× k real matrix given by
MP = (cR0 , . . . , cRT ) =

cR01 · · · cR0k
...
. . .
...
cRT1 · · · cRTk

where the row i-th indicates the canonical codified temporal decision cRi at the
moment of time ti ∈ T. Let M denote the set of all (T + 1)× k real matrices8.
7This question will be addressed in future research.
8Example 1 includes a brief illustrative example of the notation and the canonical codification
procedure.
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Any permutation pi of the alternatives {1, . . . , k} determines a canonical codi-
fied temporal decision profile piMP ∈M by permutation of the columns ofMP ,
such that, column j of the profile piMP is column pi(j) of the codification profile
MP . Similarly, any permutation σ of the moments of time {t0, . . . , tT} deter-
mines a canonical codified temporal decision profileMσP = (cRσ(0) , . . . , cRσ(T )) ∈
M by permutation of the rows ofMP , such that, row i of the profileMσP is row
σ(i) of the profileMP .
4. Decision stability measure: A novel approach
So far as one can tell from today’s research standpoint, there is not any the-
oretical definition of a measurement for establishing how much stable a decision
is over time. For this reason, the findings of this work should make an important
contribution to the field. The following section moves on to describe in greater de-
tail our general proposal to measure decisions stability over time. Moreover, two
particular definitions are established: the local and the global decision stability
measures.
Definition 1. Let P ∈ P(X) be a temporal decision profile. A decision stability
measure over time is a mapping µ : P(X) −→ [0, 1] that assigns to any temporal
decision profile a value in the unit interval and it is defined imposing the following
conditions:
(i) Full decision stability: µ(P) = 1 ⇐⇒ R0 = . . . = RT . In other words,
µ(P) = 1 if and only if the temporal decision profile is constant over time.
(ii) Decision stability neutrality: µ(piP) = µ(P) for each permutation pi of the
alternatives, i.e., the alternatives rank does not change the stability of the
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decision.
Remark 1. Let µ be a decision stability measure, the corresponding decision in-
stability measure is defined by 1− µ.
Definition 2. Let P = (P0, . . . ,PT ) ∈ P(X) be a temporal decision profile and
its canonical codified profile MP = (cR0 , . . . , cRT ) ∈ M. The local decision
stability measure between the temporal decisions at the moments of time ti−1 and
ti is a mapping θi : W(X) −→ [0, 1] given by
θi(P) = θ[i−1,i](P) = 1− ‖ cRi−1 − cRi ‖1
r
where cRi−1 and cRi are the canonical codified vectors associated to the temporal
decisionsRi−1 andRi, respectively; ‖ · ‖1 denotes the l1-norm, then
‖ cRi−1 − cRi ‖1=
k∑
h=1
| cRi−1h − cRih |; and finally, r = max
c,c′∈F
‖ c − c′ ‖1.
Therefore:
θi(P) = θ[i−1,i] (P) = 1−
k∑
h=1
| cRi−1h − cRih |
max
c,c′∈F
‖ c− c′ ‖1
In words, the local decision stability measure captures the stability between
two consecutive temporal decisions as one minus the proportion of the number
of preferences changes over the maximum that could happen between such two
consecutive moments of time.
Lemma 1. Every local decision stability measure is a decision stability measure.
13
Proposition 1. Let Ri, Rj ∈ W(X) be two two temporal decisions. The maxi-
mum instability between two temporal decisions is the diameter of the convex hull
of the set of all canonical codifications associated to W(X), i.e., F = F(W(X))
for the l1-norm. Formally,
r = max
u,v∈Conv(F)
‖ u− v ‖1
where Conv(F) =

|F|∑
j=1
αj · cj : 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1,
|F|∑
j=1
αj = 1
 .
Proposition 2. The maximum instability between two temporal decisions, r, is
determined by the following expressions:
• For an even number of alternatives, that is, for X = {1, . . . , k} with even k
r =
3
4
k2 − k
2
(1)
• For an odd number of alternatives, that is, for X = {1, . . . , k} with odd k
r =
3
4
k2 − k
2
− 1
4
(2)
Definition 3. Let P ∈ P(X) a decision temporal profile andMP ∈M its corre-
sponding canonical codification matrix. The global decision stability measure for
the temporal decision profile P ∈ P(X) is the mapping
Θ : P(X)× R+ −→ [0, 1] given by
Θ(P , λ) =
T∑
i=1
wi,T (λ) · θi(P)
where
wi,T (λ) = AT (λ) · e−λ(T−i) and AT (λ) =
 1−e
−λ
1−e−λT if λ > 0,
1
T
if λ = 0.
(3)
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Remark 2. Note that
∑T
i=1wi,T (λ) = 1, for any λ ∈ R+.
This measure is the λ-weighted mean of the local decision stability measures
over time.
Lemma 2. Every global decision stability measure is a decision stability mea-
sure.
The main points to emphasize in Definition 3 are the role of the local decision
stability measures weights and the role of the λ-parameter. As far as the first
question is concerned, the weights of the local decision stability measures depend
on the number of the moments of time included in the decision temporal profile
and consequently, they are different for each T .
With regard to the second question, the λ-parameter depicts the loss memory
effect on decision over time. In this sense:
• For λ > 0, a decision is taken on the set of alternatives X at the moment
of time ti but taking into account more intensively the most recent temporal
decisions.
• For λ = 0, a decision is taken on the set of alternatives X at the moment of
time ti but taking equally into account the previous temporal decisions.
Proposition 3. The global decision stability measure for a given decision tempo-
ral profile is a continuous function on λ-parameter.
Remark 3. Given a temporal decision profile P ∈ P(X), the limit of the global
decision stability measure for P as λ approaches ∞ is the value of the local
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decision stability measure between the temporal decisions T − 1 and T , θT (P).
That is,
lim
λ→∞
Θ(P , λ) = θT (P).
Now, an example is introduced for improving understanding and strengthening
the basic concepts described above.
Example 1. Following the example that was presented in Introduction (ranking of
daily menu starters), the set of alternatives is given by
X = {roast vegetarian, seafood chowder, caesar salad, stag’s grilled}, the
temporal set, T = {t0, t1, t3}, includes three consecutive time steps and there
are three customersN = {1, 2, 3}, i.e., there are three temporal decision profiles:
P1,P2 and P3 (one for every customer). The corresponding canonical codified
temporal decision profiles areMP1 ,MP2 andMP3 .
To analyse the level of stability of customers’ preferences over time, the local
and the global decision stability measures provided by Definitions 2 and 3 are
used. To do so, first it is necessary to compute the diameter of the convex hull of
the corresponding F being k = 4 (see Proposition 1):
r =
3
4
k2 − k
2
= 10,
and second, to compute the local stability measure for each customer:
MP1 = (cR10 , cR11) =
4 3 2 24 3 2 2
3 4 2 2
 ⇒
 θ1(P1) = 1− 0+0+0+010 = 1θ2(P1) = 1− 1+1+0+010 = 0.8
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MP2 = (cR20 , cR21) =
1 2 3 42 3 4 1
2 3 4 1
 ⇒
 θ1(P2) = 1− 1+1+1+310 = 0.4θ2(P2) = 1− 0+0+0+010 = 1
MP3 = (cR30 , cR31) =
1 3 4 24 3 2 1
3 1 2 4
 ⇒
 θ1(P3) = 1− 3+0+2+110 = 0.4θ2(P3) = 1− 1+2+0+310 = 0.4
Intuitively, θ2(P1) = 0.8 means that the number of changes between the tem-
poral decisionsR10 andR11 over the maximum that could happen (10) is 2.
Finally, Table 3 reports the weight values of the local decision stability mea-
sure for T = 2, for diferent values of λ-parameter. Table 4 shows the values of
the global stability measures for the three customers analysed. As can be seen
from Table 4, Customers 1 and 2 reported significantly more global stability mea-
sure than Customer 3 regardless of λ-parameter. Therefore, the manager team
could change the daily menu taking into account preferences of Customers 1 and
2 whatever the period of time.
wi,T (λ)
i\λ 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
1 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.32
2 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.68
Table 3: Weights values of the local decision stability
measures for different values of λ-parameter.
λ
0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
Θ(P1, λ) 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86
Θ(P2, λ) 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.81
Θ(P3, λ) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Table 4: Global stability measures for P1, P2 and P3
attending to several values of λ.
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5. Global decision stability measure: Properties and behaviour
The global decision stability measure verifies some meaningful characteristics
and properties. This section describes and analyses them. Moreover, in-depth
studies on monotonicity property and weights behaviour have been included.
Let P ∈ P(X) be a temporal decision profile andMP ∈M its corresponding
canonical codification matrix.
Compensativeness. This property ensures that the global decision stability mea-
sure is always defined between the minimum and the maximum value of the local
decision stability measure. Formally,
min(θ1(P), . . . , θT (P)) ≤ Θ(P , λ) ≤ max(θ1(P), . . . , θT (P)) whenever λ ≥ 0.
Convexity. The computation of the global decision stability measure of a decision
temporal profile on k alternatives at T + 1 moments of time is a weighted average
of the corresponding measures of two consecutive temporal subprofiles. Formally,
LetP ∈ P(X) be a temporal decision profile and I1, I2 an overlapped partition
of T, with
I1 = {t0 = tI10 , . . . , tI1T1}, I2 = {tI1T1 = tI20 , . . . , tI2T2 = tT}, T1 + T2 = T
Then,
Θ(P , λ) = αλ,T (I1) ·Θ(PI1 , λ) + αλ,T (I2) ·Θ(PI2 , λ), (4)
where the weights αλ,T (·) are defined by:
αλ,T (I1) =
 e
−λ(T−T1)−e−λT
1−e−λT if λ 6= 0
T1
T
if λ = 0
, αλ,T (I2) =
 1−e
−λ(T−T1)
1−e−λT if λ 6= 0
T2
T
if λ = 0
(5)
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Remark 4. If I1, I2 is a overlapped partition of T = {t0, t1, . . . , tT}, then it is
straightforward to check that: αλ,T (I1) + αλ,T (I2) = 1.
The convexity property can be extended to the case of any collection of sub-
profiles generated by an overlapped partition of the temporal set T. As a conse-
quence, the global decision stability measure of P can be built from the decision
stability measures of such sub-profiles. This is addressed in Subsection 5.2.
No Timelessness. Only if λ = 0 permutations on time moments do not change the
stability of the decision over time. Formally,
Θ(Pσ, λ) = Θ(P , λ).
Convergence to full stability. Suppose that q new consecutive times are added to
T, T¯q = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1, . . . , tT+q} and that the temporal extension of the tem-
poral decision profile P ∈ P(X), P¯q is defined such that
RT+1 = . . . = RT+q then the global decision stability measure of P¯q approa-
ches one as q approaches infinity. Formally,
lim
q→∞
Θ(P¯q, λ) = 1, for all λ ≥ 0.
5.1. Discussion on Monotonicity
For the purpose of analysis of the consistency of the global decision stability
measure and taking into account the crucial importance of the monotonicity prop-
erty in many everyday temporal decisions, the following part of this paper moves
on to describe in greater detail the behaviour of the global decision stability mea-
sure under several monotonicity approaches.
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Absolute monotonicity. Suppose that a new moment of time tT+1 is added to T,
and a temporal decision is taken on X at tT+1 in the sense RT = RT+1. If P is
not constant over time, then the global decision stability measure of the enlarged
profile P¯ is strictly higher than the original one. Formally,
Θ(P , λ) < Θ(P¯ , λ) if Θ(P , λ) < 1.
Remark 5. In the same way as absolute monotonicity property, suppose that a
new moment of time tT+1 is added to T, but now a temporal decision is taken on
X at tT+1 in the sense that the temporal decision makes in T + 1, i.e., RT+1 is
opposite to the temporal decision made in T , RT . If P is not constant over time,
then the global decision stability measure of the enlarged profile P¯ is strictly
smaller than the original one. Formally,
If RT 6= RT+1 and ‖ cRT − cRT+1 ‖1= maxc,c′∈F ‖ c − c′ ‖1= r, then
θT+1(P¯I2) = 0. Consequently,
Θ(P , λ) > Θ(P¯ , λ) and Θ(P¯ , λ) ∈ [0, Θ(P , λ)) .
Relative monotonicity. Suppose that a new moment of time tT+1 is added to T,
and a temporal decision is taken on X at tT+1 in the sense RT 6= RT+1 but
r >‖ cRT − cRT+1 ‖1> 0, i.e., the temporal decisions at T and T + 1 are different
but not opposite. If P is not constant over time, then the global decision stabi-
lity measure of the enlarged profile P¯ is strictly higher than the minimun of the
stabilities of the original one and the subprofile generated by the two last time
steps. Formally,
Θ(P¯ , λ) ≥ min{Θ(P , λ),Θ(P¯{tT ,tT+1}, λ)}
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Comparative monotonicity. Let T = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1} be an extended temporal
set. Let P , P ′ ∈ ⋃T≥1W(X)T+2 be two extended temporal decision profiles as-
sociated toT such thatP = (R0, . . . ,RT ,RT+1) andP ′ =
(R0, . . . ,RT ,R′T+1).
If the relationship betweenRT+1 andR′T+1 is given by
‖ cRT − cR′T+1 ‖1>‖ cRT − cRT+1 ‖1
then, the global decision stability measure of the enlarged profile P¯ is strictly
higher than the global decision stability measure of the enlarged profile P¯ ′. For-
mally,
Θ(P , λ) > Θ(P ′, λ)
Decision monotonicity. Let X˜ = {x1, . . . , xk, xk+1, . . . , xk+q} be an expanded
set of alternatives of X. Let P = (R1, . . . ,RT ) a profile, and P˜ = (R˜1, . . . , R˜T )
any expanded temporal profile such that:
1. The temporal decision on the set of new alternatives is constant over time,
that is, R˜i|{xk+1,...,xk+q} = R˜j|{xk+1,...,xk+q}, for all i, j ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
2. The new alternatives are always better or worse graded that old ones, that
is, xrR˜ixs or xsR˜ixr for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, s ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + q}, and
i ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Then, the global decision stability measure of the expanded
profile P˜ is strictly higher than the original one. Formally:
Θ(P , λ) < Θ(P˜ , λ).
5.2. Weights behaviour: Decomposition of the global stability decision measure
Weights behaviour is an essential aspect of study in decision making problems
due to their changes can greatly affect results. Therefore, it is necessary to know
how weights can perform when changes in assumptions take place.
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On the basis of the above, this subsection is focused on analysing weights
behaviour and then, how the global stability decision measure can be decomposed.
For this propose, the convexity property is extended to the case of any collection
of sub-profiles generated by an overlapped partition of the temporal set T. As
a consequence, the global decision stability measure of P can be built from the
decision stability measures of such sub-profiles. More specifically, the global
decision stability measure of a temporal decision profile P is a weighted average
of the corresponding global decision stability measures in each sub-profile where
the weights represent the contributions of the different sub-profiles to the global
decision stability measure. The following proposition ensures the aforementioned
issues.
Proposition 4. Let P ∈ P(X) be a temporal decision profile on the time se-
quenceT = {t0, . . . , tT} and {I1, . . . , Is} an overlapped partition ofT, such that
Ik = {tIk0 , . . . , tIkTk} for k = 1, . . . , s. Then
Θ(P , λ) =
s∑
k=1
αλ,T (Ik) ·Θ(PIk , λ) (6)
where αλ,T (·) is given by
αλ,T (Ik) =

e−λ(T−T
+
k ) − e−λ(T−T−k )
1− e−λT if λ 6= 0
Tk
T
if λ = 0
(7)
being T+k =
∑k
j=1 Tj and T
−
k =
∑k−1
j=1 Tj the upper and the lower times indices
of the subprofile Ik, respectively and it satisfies
∑s
k=1 αλ,T (Ik) = 1.
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6. Discussion and real examples
In the following pages, it is going to put in practice the methodologies pro-
posed in Section 4. To this purpose two cases of study are presented. The first one
explores into the characteristics of Spanish citizens’ voting behaviour. The second
one attempts to evaluate European citizens’ preferences about passenger cars by
means of a particular survey: a comparative research including preferences from
three different European countries: Germany, Norway and Spain.
6.1. The stability of the political opinion in the Spanish society: A case of study
The objective of this case of study is to research into the characteristics of
Spanish citizens’ voting behaviour and also to measure the stability of such voting
opinions.
Data for this study were collected from the CIS, the Spanish Center of Socio-
logical Research. The CIS carries out polls on a monthly basis and they include
interviews from around 2, 500 randomly-chosen Spanish people9 although polls
only contain questions on voting intention in January, April, July and October10.
In particular, this research incorporates the polls from January 2016 to October
2018, i.e., twelve moments of time that can be represented by the temporal set,
T = {t0, . . . , t11} where t0 corresponds to January 2016, t1 to April 2016, t2 to
July 2016 and so on, up to t11 that corresponds to October 2018. During theses
moments of time the set of candidates is made up of four political parties: Partido
9All data are available though the website: http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/
11_barometros/index.jsp
10Apart from people’s political preferences, interviews incorporate social and demographic in-
formation.
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Popular (PP), Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol (PSOE), Grupo Podemos (GP)
and Ciudadanos (C’s) that it can be denoted by X = {PP, PSOE,GP,C ′s}.
The Spanish society by means of the aforementioned voting opinions surveys
establishes the temporal decisions11 on the set of candidatesX at T. Such tempo-
ral decisions are collected in Table 5.
2016 2017 2018
Jun. R0 : GP  PP  PSOE  C ′s Jun. R4 : PP  GP  PSOE  C ′s Jun. R8 : PSOE  C ′s  PP  GP
Apr. R1 : GP  PP  PSOE  C ′s Apr. R5 : PP  GP  PSOE  C ′s Apr. R9 : C ′s  PSOE  PP  GP
Jul. R2 : PP  PSOE  GP  C ′s Jul. R6 : PSOE  PP  GP  C ′s Jul. R10 : PSOE  C ′s  PP  GP
Oct. R3 : PP  GP  PSOE  C ′s Oct. R7 : PP  PSOE  C ′s  GP Oct. R11 : PSOE  C ′s  PP  GP
Table 5: Temporal decisions established by voting opinions surveys.
From temporal decisions on Table 5, the following temporal decision pro-
file is obtained: P = (R0,R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6,R7,R8,R9,R10,R11) and
its corresponding canonical codified temporal decision profile is given byMP =
(cR0 , . . . , cR10 , cR11).
Once the framework of the decision making problem has been established,
the local decision stability measures can be computed by Definition 2. Table 6
collects such values.
i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
θi(P) 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0
Table 6: Values of local stability measures.
11Data from direct estimation.
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Now and in order to compute the global decision stability measure for P and
to analyse the effect of the λ-parameter, i.e., the loss memory effect of the Spanish
society on political parties over time, different values λ-parameter are considered
specifically, λ = {0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Taking into account such values of the
λ-parameter, Table 7 shows the different weights values of the local decision sta-
bility measures wi,T (λ), i = 1, . . . , 11 computed by means of Definition 3.
wi,T (λ)
λ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909 0.0909
0.1 0.0525 0.0580 0.0641 0.0708 0.0783 0.0865 0.0956 0.1057 0.1168 0.1291 0.1426
0.25 0.0194 0.0249 0.0320 0.0411 0.0527 0.0677 0.0869 0.1116 0.1433 0.1840 0.2363
0.5 0.0027 0.0044 0.0072 0.0119 0.0197 0.0324 0.0535 0.0882 0.1453 0.2396 0.3951
0.75 0.0003 0.0006 0.0013 0.0028 0.0059 0.0124 0.0263 0.0556 0.1178 0.2493 0.5278
Table 7: Weights values of the local decision stability measures, wi,T (λ), for different values of
λ-parameter.
Finally, the global decision stability measures for the different values of λ-
parameter are showed in Table 8. As can be seen from Table 5, Spanish voting
λ
0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
Θ(P , λ) 0.8000 0.7997 0.8117 0.8502 0.8884
Table 8: Global stability measures for P attending to several values of λ.
decisions could seem uneven because some temporal decisions are exactly the
opposite, for instance:
R0 : GP  PP  PSOE  C ′s, R9 : C ′s  PSOE  PP  GP
25
and also there is no an exact match between any temporal decision. Attending to
these relevant facts, one could think that there should be tenuous stability among
Spanish political preferences but surprisingly, the global stability measures dur-
ing T for several values of λ are close to 1 (see Table 8), i.e., the results show a
high level of stability of the Spanish society’s political opinion. This result could
give the impression of being somewhat counter-intuitive however, closer inspec-
tion of Table 5 shows that the Spanish society’s opinion has undergone no abrupt
modifications from period to period and consequently, most of the local decision
stability measures are near 1, as it can observe in Table 6.
6.2. Buying a car: Have European changed their mind?
Drawing upon the strands of this research on preference stability, this study
attempts to evaluate European citizens’ preferences about passenger cars and to
study if they are changing their mind on buying electrical cars.
Right now, the purchase of electric cars has moved from an environmental
issue to a serious proposition for drivers. The sales of electrical cars are still weak
but there is an increase in them due to the European Union (EU) regulations on
combustions cars scheduled for 2050. The data confirms that drivers’ preferences
are changing but how are they changing? Are their decisions stable? In order to
find answers to these questions this subsection includes a comparative analysis of
passenger car market on three EU countries.
Moving on now to consider three European countries, Germany, Norway and
Spain. The purpose of this case of study is to mak comparisons among the cit-
izens’ car preferences of the three aforementioned countries. Data were collec-
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ted from ACEA, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association12. Even
though ACEA publishes monthly passenger car registration data13, this enquiry
incorporates the quarterly change in registrations for passenger cars from the
first quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018, considering then, 7 moments
of time (quarters in this case) that can be represented by the temporal set, T =
{t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6} where t0 corresponds to the first quarter of 2017, t1 to the
second quarter of 2017, t2 to the third quarter of 2017, and so on, up to t6 that
corresponds to the third quarter of 2018.
Based on the data provided by ACEA the passengers cars registered during
these periods of time can be classified like battery electric vehicles (BE), plugged-
in hybrid electric vehicles (PHE), hybrid electric vehicles (HE), alternatively-
powered vehicles, other than electric (AP), fuel vehicles (F) and diesel vehicles
(D). Therefore, the set of alternatives can be denoted byX = {BE,PHE,HE,AP, F,D}.
Table 9 gathers citizens’ temporal car preferences for each quarter from Ger-
many, Norway and Spain. These preferences are based on data provided by
ACEA.
From the temporal decisions presented in Table 9, Table 10 collects the tem-
poral decision profiles for each country as well as their corresponding canonical
codified temporal decision profiles.
Thereupon by means of Definition 2, the local decision stability measures for
each country are computed. Table 11 collects separately such values for each
country.
12All data available through the website: https://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/
category/passenger-cars-registrations
13Except in the summertime.
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Germany Norway
2017
Q1 RG0 : BE  PHE  HE  D  AP  F
2017
Q1 RN0 : AP  PHE  HE  BE  D  F
Q2 RG1 : PHE  F  HE  D  AP  BE Q2 RN1 : BE  D  F  HE  PHE  AP
Q3 RG2 : AP  BE  PHE  HE  F  D Q3 RN2 : AP  PHE  BE  HE  F  D
Q4 RG3 : AP  BE  F  PHE  HE  D Q4 RN3 : AP  BE  PHE  F  HE  D
2018
Q1 RG4 : AP  HE  BE  D  F  PHE
2018
Q1 RN4 : BE  D  F  PHE  HE  AP
Q2 RG5 : AP  HE  F  D  PHE  BE Q2 RN5 : HE  PHE  F  D  BE  AP
Q3 RG6 : HE  PHE  BE  D  F  AP Q3 RN6 : BE  D  HE  F  PHE  AP
Spain
2017
Q1 RS0 : AP  PHE  HE  D  F  BE
2018
Q1 RS4 : AP  HE  D  F  BE  PHE
Q2 RS1 : PHE  AP  F  BE  HE  D Q2 RS5 : AP  PHE  HE  F  D  BE
Q3 RS2 : BE  AP  PHE  HE  D  F Q3 RS6 : BE  AP  HE  D  PHE  F
Q4 RS3 : AP  BE  PHE  BE  HE  D
Table 9: Quarterly car preferences in Germany, Norway and Spain.
Germany Norway Spain
PG = (RG0 , . . . ,RG6 ) PN = (RN0 , . . . ,RN6 ) PS = (RS0 , . . . ,RS6 )
MPG = (cRG0 , . . . , cRG6 ) MPN = (cRN0 , . . . , cRN6 ) MPS = (cRS0 , . . . , cRS6 )
Table 10: Temporal decision profiles and their corresponding canonical codified temporal decision
profiles for every country.
With the goal of calculating the global decision stability measure for each
profile, i.e., for each country, several values of λ-parameter have been considered.
The weights values of the local decision stability measures are shown in Table
12. These weights values are the same for calculating the global decision stability
measure for PG, PN and PS .
Last but not least, having defined the weights values of the local decision sta-
bility measures, it now moves on to compute the global decision stability measures
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for PG,PN and PS to different values of λ-parameter. The values are shown in
Table 13.
i
1 2 3 4 5 6
θi(PG) 0.58 0.33 0.83 0.58 0.75 0.42
θi(PN) 0.25 0.33 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.50
θi(PS) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.67 0.50
Table 11: Values of local stability measures for
each country.
wi,T (λ)
λ 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
0.1 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21
0.25 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.28
0.5 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.41
0.75 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.53
Table 12: Weights values of the local decision stability
measures, wi,T (λ), for different values of λ-parameter
to Germany, Norway and Spain.
λ
0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
Θ(PG, λ) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.54
Θ(PN , λ) 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51
Θ(PS, λ) 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55
Table 13: Global stability measures for PG, PN and PS attending to λ.
Many customers consider buying electric cars as a real chance. Cars electric
market is already a reality and the electric cars supply is increasingly numerous,
more active and varied. These facts generate that a growing number of drivers
consider electric cars a perfectly valid option. However, the requirement of a
connection point at home and travel limitations (not to travel much longer distance
than 200-300 km between charges) make big cities the natural domain of electric
cars, against long-distance journeys at least with some freedom of movement.
29
All these factors provoke continuous changing drivers’ preferences as can be
seen from Table 9 and more particularly in Germany and Norway due to Spanish
electric cars market is less developed. The results of the global stability measures
corroborate all the foregoing as Table 13 shows.
7. Conclusions and future research
The main goal of the current study has been to determine a general proce-
dure to measure decisions stability over time under the assumption of complete
pre-orders. To develop a deep and strong general measure, two minimum condi-
tions have been required, full decision stability and decision stability neutrality.
Moreover, this work contributes to existing knowledge of preferences behaviour
by providing two particular decision stability measures, the local and the global
decision stability measure. The study of such measures is completed including
the main features of the novel approaches as well as several mathematical results
on the proposed measures behaviour. Therefore, this research will prove useful in
expanding our understanding of how decision change over time from a theoretical
and practical perspective. Moreover, the present contribution includes two real
cases of study to explore into the characteristics of Spanish citizens’ voting be-
haviour and to attempt to analyse European citizens’ preferences about passenger
car market.
Finally, this research has thrown up many questions in need of further inves-
tigation for example, it must be interesting to develop a new measure being able
of capturing preferences disparity between non consecutive moments of time and
to define a novel measurement specially design for social preferences stability
considering the bounded rationality of consumer behaviour.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is trivial from Definition 2 and the definition of the permu-
tation pi of the temporal decision profile, piP . 
Proof of Proposition 1. The result is a mere consequence of the following state-
ment: Given a distance d(·, ·) based on a norm ‖ · ‖, for any A ⊆ Rn, diam(A) =
diam(Conv(A)) where diam(A) = supp,q∈A ‖p − q‖. In this case, A = F and
‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let c, c′ ∈ F be two canonical codified temporal deci-
sions such that r = ‖c−c′‖1. There is no loss of generality in assuming that c is a
non-increasing vector. This implies that c′ is a non-decreasing vector, because in
other case, it could be permuted two non-ordered positions of c′, to produce c¯, and
then a computation provides ‖c− c′‖1 ≤ c− c¯‖1, that contradicts the choice of c
and c′. By the characterization of the canonical codified preorder [30, Proposition
1], it is possible to infer: cj ∈ [k − j + 1, k], and c′j ∈ [j, k], for j = 1, . . . , k.
Therefore:
‖c− c′‖1 =
k∑
j=1
|cj − c′j| ≤
k∑
j=1
max{k − j, k − (k − j + 1)} ≤
k∑
j=1
max{k − j, j − 1)}.
The two values inside the maximum are complementary. The first is good for j
small, and the second is suitable for j large. The crossover takes place for j0 such
that k − j0 ≤ j0 − 1 ⇒ j0 ≥ k+12 . Considering the parity of the number of
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alternatives:
Even k:
k∑
j=1
max{k − j, j − 1)} =
k/2∑
j=1
(k − j) +
k∑
j= k
2
+1
(j − 1) = 3
4
k2 − k
2
,
Odd k:
k∑
j=1
max{k − j, j − 1)} =
(k−1)/2∑
j=1
(k − j) +
k∑
j= k+1
2
(j − 1) = 3
4
k2 − k
2
− 1
4
.
These results guarantee that r is upper bounded by the expressions (1) and (2),
respectively. The proof is completed by finding two feasible canonical codified
temporal decisions ofF, whose distance is r. Motivated by the previous argument,
we choose:
Even k : c = (
k
2
−times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k, k, . . . , k,
k
2
,
k
2
− 1, . . . , 1), c′ = (1, 2, . . . , k
2
,
k
2
−times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k, k, . . . , k)
Odd k : c = (
(k−1)
2
−times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k, k, . . . , k,
k + 1
2
,
k − 1
2
, . . . , 1), c′ = (1, 2, . . . ,
k − 1
2
,
(k−1)
2
−times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k, k, . . . , k)
This conclude the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2. By Definitions 2, 3 and assuming the permutation pi of the
temporal decision profile piP , the proof is immediate. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that for λ0 > 0: lim
λ→λ0
Θ(P , λ) = Θ(P , λ0). On the
other hand, for λ0 = 0, using L’Hoˆpital’s rule it has been checked, lim
λ→0
(wi,T (λ)) =
1
T
, and therefore lim
λ→0
Θ(P , λ) =
T∑
i=1
1
T
· θi (P) = Θ(P , 0). 
Proof of Compensativeness. Immediate from Definitions 2 and 3. 
Proof of Convexity. Definition 3 is invoked to write
Θ(P , λ) =
T∑
i=1
wi,T (λ) · θi(P) =
T1∑
j=1
wj,T (λ) · θj(PI1) +
T2∑
j=1
wj+T1,T (λ) · θj(PI2)
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On the one hand, examining the weight ωj,T (λ), and since T = T1 + T2
wj,T (λ) =AT (λ) · e−λ(T−i) = AT (λ) · e−λT2 · e−λ(T1−i)
=
AT (λ)
AT1(λ)
· e−λT2 · AT1(λ) · e−λ(T1−i) =
AT (λ)
AT1(λ)
· e−λT2 · ωj,T1(λ).
From (3) it is possible to infer
AT (λ)
AT1(λ)
· e−λT2 =

1− e−λT1
1− e−λT · e
−λT2 =
e−λ(T−T1) − e−λ(T−0)
1− e−λT if λ 6= 0
1/T
1/T1
= T1T if λ = 0
 = αλ,T (I1).
On the other hand
wj+T1,T (λ) =AT (λ) · e−λ(T−(j+T1)) =
AT (λ)
AT2(λ)
· AT2(λ) · e−λ(T2−j) =
AT (λ)
AT2(λ)
· ωj,T2(λ)
and again from (3) it is obtained
AT (λ)
AT2(λ)
=

1− e−λT2
1− e−λT =
e−λ(T−(T1+T2)) − e−λ(T−T1)
1− e−λT if λ 6= 0
1/T
1/T2
= T2T if λ = 0
 = αλ,T (I2)
Collecting the previous results we conclude the proof. 
Proof of No Timelessness. The proof is a straightforward from Definitions 2 and
3. 
Proof of Convergence full stability. The extended decision temporal profile P¯q
can be decomposed into two temporal decision subprofiles such that:
P¯q = (PI1 ,PI2) = (
PI1︷ ︸︸ ︷
R0, . . . ,RT ,RT+1,RT+2, . . . ,RT+q︸ ︷︷ ︸
PI2
.) ∈
⋃
T≥1
W(X)T+1+q
then, using the convexity property with I1 = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1}, and I2 = {tT+1, . . . , tT+q}:
Θ(P¯q, λ) = αλ,T (I1) ·Θ(PI1 , λ) + αλ,T (I2) ·Θ(PI2 , λ),
αλ,T (I1) =
e−λ(q−1) − e−λ(T+q)
1− e−λ(T+q) , αλ,T (I2) =
1− e−λ(q−1)
1− e−λ(T+q)
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Taking the limit: limq→∞ αλ,T (I1) = 0, limq→∞ αλ,T (I2) = 1. Since Θ(PI2 , λ) =
1 because RT+1 = . . . = RT+q and Θ(PI1 , λ) does not depended on q, it is
possible to infer the desired result. 
Proof of Absolute monotonicity. Let P¯ = (R0, . . . ,RT ,RT+1) ∈
⋃
T≥1W(X)
T+2
an extended decision temporal profile. Consider the following overlapped par-
tition on the extended temporal set T = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1}, I1 = {t0, . . . , tT}
and I2 = {tT , tT+1} that generates two consecutive temporal decision subprofiles
P¯I1 = P and P¯I2 , P¯I1∪I2 = P¯ . By convexity property: Θ(P¯ , λ) = αλ,T (I1) ·
Θ(P , λ) + αλ,T (I2) · θT+1(P¯I2). Taking into account that RT = RT+1 and
Definition 2: ‖cRT − cRT+1‖1 = 0 and then θT+1(P¯I2) = 1, consequently,
Θ(P¯ , λ) ∈ (Θ(P , λ), 1). 
Proof of Relative monotonicity. This proof is similar to the previous one and will
be omitted.
Proof of Comparative monotonicity.. Let P¯ = (R0, . . . ,RT ,RT+1), P ′ =
(R0, . . . ,RT ,R′T+1) ∈⋃
T≥1W(X)
T+2 be two extended temporal decision profiles. Consider the over-
lapped partition on the set T = {t0, . . . , tT , tT+1}, I1 = {t0, . . . , tT} and I2 =
{tT , tT+1} that generates two consecutive temporal decision subprofiles for each
extended temporal profile:
P¯I1 = P and P¯I2 , P¯(I1∪I2) = P¯ for P
P¯I1 = P and P¯ ′(I2), P¯ ′(I1∪I2) = P¯ ′ for P ′
By convexity property:
Θ(P¯ , λ) = αλ,T (I1) ·Θ(P , λ) + αλ,T (I2) · θT+1(P¯I2)
Θ(P¯ ′, λ) = αλ,T (I1) ·Θ(P , λ) + αλ,T (I2) · θT+1(P¯ ′(I2))
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Considering ‖cRT − cR′T+1‖1 > ‖cRT − cRT+1‖1 and Definition 2, it is possible
to conclude: θT+1(P¯I2) > θT+1(P¯ ′(I2)), consequently, Θ(P¯ , λ) > Θ(P¯ ′, λ). 
Proof of Decision monotonicity.. Let cRi = (c
Ri
1 , . . . , c
Ri
k ) and
cR˜i = (c
R˜i
1 , . . . , c
R˜i
k , . . . , c
R˜i
k+q) be the canonical codifications of Ri and R˜i, re-
spectively, for i = 0, . . . T . Note that the value of each coefficient of cRi (or cR˜i),
is given by14:
cRij =| {r : xjRi xr} |,
therefore, conditions (a) and (b) imply:
1 cR˜ij = c
R˜i
j for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + q} and i ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
2 cR˜ij =
 c
Ri
j if the new alternatives are better graded,
cRij + q if the new alternatives are worse graded.
In any case, it is obtained: ‖cR˜i−1−cR˜i‖1 = ‖cRi−1−cRi‖1,for all i = {1, . . . , T}.
Using this result and the fact that r < r̂, it is got:
θi(P) = 1−
‖cR˜i−1 − cR˜i‖1
r
< 1− ‖cRi−1 − cRi‖1
r˜
= θi(P˜)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , T} and consequently, Θ(P , λ) < Θ(P˜ , λ). 
Proof of Proposition 4.. The proof is by induction on s. The case s = 2 is the
convexity property that it was early established15. Assuming the case s − 1 and
it is shown that (6) holds for s. Since {I1, . . . , Is} is an overlapped partition, it is
14see Gonza´lez-Arteaga, Alcantud and de Andre´s Calle [30].
15If s = 2, i.e., the convexity property, T+k = T1 and T
−
k = 0 for k = 1; and
T+k = T1 + T2 = T and T
−
k = T1 for k = 2.
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obtained:
|Ik| = Tk + 1, for k = 1, . . . , s, T1 + T2 + . . .+ Ts = T.
Firstly, an auxiliary overlapped partition is defined {J1, J2} given by: J1 = I1 ∪
. . .∪Is−1 and J2 = Is. The cardinality of these new sets are |J1| = 1+
∑s−1
k=1 Tk, or
equivalently |J1| = 1 + (T − Ts) and |J2| = Is. Secondly, the convexity property
(4) is invoked and then, by the induction hypothesis it is possible to write:
Θ(P , λ) = αλ,T (J1) ·Θ(PJ1 , λ) + αλ,T (J2) ·Θ(PJ2 , λ)
= αλ,T (J1)
(
s−1∑
k=1
αλ,(T−Ts)(Ik) ·Θ(PIk , λ)
)
+ αλ,T (Is) ·Θ(PIs , λ)
Now the product of α-weights is studied, i.e., αλ,T (J1) · αλ,(T−Ts)(Ik). From
(7), assuming initially λ > 0 and remaining that the upper time index, T+J1 , and
lower time index, T−J1 , of the set J1 are
∑s−1
j=1 Tj and 0, respectively, some simply
computations provide αλ,T (J1) · αλ,(T−Ts)(Ik) = αλ,T (Ik). The case λ = 0 is
simpler and it can be omitted. Therefore, the statement (6) is consequence of the
two previous results. Finally, to get
∑s
k=1 αλ,T (Ik) = 1, note that the numerators
of αλ,T (·) are a telescoping series16. 
16A series whose partial sums have a fixed number of terms after their cancellation (see T. M.
Apostol, Calculus, Volume 1, Blaisdell Publishing Company).
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